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Among practitioners, inventory is often thought to be the root of all evil in operations management.  The 
stock market hates it, the media abhors it, and managers have come to fear it.  But high inventory levels can 
also be the result of strategic buying and high-availability strategies.  The problem is that when the market 
sees lots of inventory, it cannot tell whether it is because of poor or smart operations.  We hypothesize that 
inventory has a signaling role.  In our model, publicly-traded firms use inventory levels to signal their 
operational competence to the market.  There is a separating equilibrium that leads some firms to maintain 
inventory levels below what their capability could achieve.  We offer this as one explanation why, for 
example, stock-outs are pervasive even among operationally competent firms.  We provide empirical evidence 
for the assumptions behind this inventory signaling hypothesis: (1) the market cannot tell the difference 
between “good” and “bad” inventory; and (2) the counterfactual: the market punishes firms when it can tell 
that their inventory is bad, such as when they write off supplies.  Consistent with these assumptions, we find 
that inventory levels do not explain firm value.  And on average, stocks suffer an abnormal negative return of 
7% in the month of announcing inventory write-offs. 
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Inventory Signals 
1.  Introduction 
Roughly “a third of the consumers entering a store are looking for a specific item but fail to buy because 
they cannot find it.” (Wharton at Work, 2002)  The common explanation for this situation is poor operations 
management.  Perhaps the store has weak forecasting capability, poor information systems, or long lead times 
(e.g., Fisher and Raman (1996) and Fisher, et al. (2001)). 
We offer an additional explanation: stock-outs might be due to managers’ overly aggressive concern with 
inventory levels.  A widely held belief among practitioners is that inventory is one of the clearest symptoms of 
poor operations management.  “As far as I’m concerned, inventory is the root of all evil,” says Victor Fung, 
Chairman of Li & Fung (Magretta 1998).  Compounding this obsession with inventory is the asymmetry of 
information between publicly-traded firms and the capital market on what high levels of inventory really 
mean.  They could certainly imply incompetence.  But high inventory levels can also be the by-product of 
forward or bulk buying (e.g., Lal, et. al. 1996) or intentionally high service levels to reduce stock-outs (Arrow, 
Harris and Marschak, 1951).  We can think of these strategic actions as investing in the future, to get a lower 
cost of goods or more loyal customers.  The problem, it might be surmised, is that the stock market cannot 
tell whether a firm with high inventory levels is poorly managed or is investing in the future.  Information on 
inventory levels is by comparison easier to get than information such as the benefits of forward buying, the 
lost opportunities due to stock-outs, or the magnitude of shrinkage and poor execution (e.g., Raman, et al. 
(2001)).  Compared with other firms with similar financial statements, the market might assign a high-
inventory but competent firm a lower valuation than it deserves.  Facing such a situation, even a firm 
pursuing strategic buying or a high-availability strategy would rationally maintain a lower level of inventory 
than if such an asymmetry of information does not exist.  In this way, we hypothesize that inventory has a 
signaling role. 
After a literature review in section 1, we formalize the intuition of the above argument in section 2.  In 
section 3, we provide empirical evidence for two observable assumptions of our inventory signaling 
hypothesis: (1) that the market cannot tell the difference between “good” and “bad” inventory and, (2) that it 
punishes firms when their inventory that is obviously bad – i.e., when it is written off.  For the first, we use a 
panel dataset of firms drawn from COMPUSTAT and CRSP.  Using several estimation methods, including   3
fixed-effects and Heckman corrections for selection bias, and various measures of valuation such as Q, we 
find that the market offers statistically the same valuation to firms of varying inventory levels, controlling for 
other relevant variables.  For the second, we cull from First Call a dataset of 61 announcements of inventory 
write-offs that have no confounding informational effects.  Using event analyses based on market models and 
Fama-French factors, we find that the market punishes firms with inventory write-offs by depressing their 
stock returns by about 7% in the month of the announcement. 
We qualify the signaling hypothesis in several ways.  First, like all hypotheses, it can only be supported by 
non-falsification rather than proven with definitive evidence.  Second, the hypothesis does not assert that 
stock-outs by competent firms must be due to inventory signaling.  Rather, it says that all else being equal, 
lack of transparency on firms’ strategies would lead firms to stock below their competence level.  More 
provocatively, it predicts that competent firms’ inventory and service levels would rise if firms’ strategies 
become more transparent through say, policy reform. 
2.  The Signaling Role of Inventory 
The modeling of asymmetric information in operations management has an early beginning, starting with 
work on decomposition schemes for multi-echelon stochastic inventory systems (Clark and Scarf, 1960).  The 
emphasis in this stream of research is on designing optimal incentive systems among agents in a supply chain 
(see, for example, Cachon and Zipkin (1999), the review in Tsay, et al. (1999), and the special issue in Chen 
and Zenios (2005)).  The closest works related to the model described in this paper are those of Ackoff 
(1967) and Porteus and Whang (1991).  They highlight the conflict of incentives between a marketing 
department, which is keen to use higher inventory levels to avoid stock-outs, and a purchasing department, 
which is keen to have lower inventory levels to keep holding costs down.  The latter paper also develops an 
internal futures market as an incentive-compatible solution to the problem.  Others, beginning with Monahan 
(1984), work out pricing discounts that can induce purchasing managers to order quantities that are more 
optimal.  These papers do not analyze the signaling role of inventory for publicly-traded firms, the subject of 
our paper. 
In the economics literature, the work on costly signals begins with Ross (1973) and Spence (1973).  The 
analysis in this paper is more closely associated with several themes in corporate finance.  For example, it is 
along the same lines that Myers (1977) first show that information asymmetry between insiders and market 
leads to debt overhang, resulting in underinvestment of good projects (see also the models by Ross (1977)   4
and Leland and Pyke (1977)).  Indeed, the model here can be viewed as a re-interpretation of the class of 
models on managerial myopia and career concerns, such as those in Holmstrom (1999b) and Holmstrom and 
Ricart I Costa (1986) for labor markets, Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) in predatory pricing, and Stein (1988) 
and Stein (1989) in corporate finance.  In these papers, the key idea is that firms are short-sighted, trading off 
efficient long-term investments for inefficient short-term benefits.  They might do so for various reasons, 
such as the short-term nature of managerial compensation coupled with the opaqueness of information 
available to capital markets. 
These initial “myopia models” spawn a very large literature, both in theory and empirics, ranging from 
banking, managerial incentives, product-market competition, capital structure, accounting, and marketing – 
examples of more recent work are those by Chemmanur and Ravid (1999), Prendergast (1999),  Rotemberg 
and Scharfstein (1990), Fluck (1998), Srivastava, et al. (1998), Darrough and Rangan (2005).  None, however, 
have considered the operations management setting.  From a theoretical perspective, it seems natural to posit 
an inventory signaling hypothesis that argues for a signaling role of inventory. 
In this paper, we are interested in empirically testing the basic assumptions of the hypothesis.  As 
mentioned, these are: (1) whether the market can tell if high inventory in a firm is due to poor versus smart 
operations, and (2) when the market is able to tell the difference, whether the market punishes the firm.  The 
hypothesis’ assumptions rely on the answers to the first question to be “no” and the second to be “yes.”  The 
answers are not intuitively obvious.  For example, it is plausible that information about inventory can be 
obtained at a sufficiently low cost - e.g., by analysts plowing the aisles of supermarkets.  With such 
information, the market can then tell whether high inventory is the result of poor operations or of smart 
strategy.  Much of the analyst industry is predicated on this proposition.  As an example, Raman, et al. (2005) 
report that Berman Capital purports to do just that.  Much of the literature in finance, however, cast doubt on 
such a proposition (e.g., Treynor and Mazuy (1966), Fama (1970)).  However, we acknowledge recent studies, 
such as Bollen and Busse (2001), that show that money managers have some ability to time the market.  
Interestingly, these same authors later show that such superior ability is short-lived (Bollen and Busse, 2004).  
Nevertheless, Gaur, et al. (1999) provide evidence that inventory levels might offer some explanatory power 
in explaining stock returns, but their study is on only the retail industry.  Clearly, it is unsettled whether the 
market in general, and analysts in particular, can discern the value of firms based on public information about 
inventory and other aspects of operations strategy and management.   5
The second assumption, that the market punishes firms when they write off inventory, also does not have 
a consensus in the literature.  There is a plausible alternative story that the market reacts positively to inventory 
write-offs.  This might be because write-offs are seen as a signal that firms have put the worst behind them 
(the “favorable resolution” story rather than the “bad news” one, as framed by Elliott and Shaw (1988)), or 
write-offs are made in reaction to changes in fundamental conditions (e.g., Francis, et al. (1996)).  Either way, 
Elliott and Shaw (1988) note that “the financial press frequently treats these write-offs as though they are 
viewed favorably by the securities market..”  Academic research is more guarded, since it is the surprise 
element, not the mere event of a write-off, which would be the logical driver of market reaction.  Much of the 
accounting literature treats write-offs in aggregate terms, in the form of “big baths.”  In these cases, the 
documented market reaction is invariably negative.  Two studies are particularly noteworthy.  The first, by 
Francis, et al. (1996), documents market reaction to inventory write-offs.  They conduct an event analysis 
based on write-off announcements reported in PR Newswire between 1989 and 1992.  Although inventory 
write-offs are not the focus of the paper, they do report a -31.7% change in excess return over days -1 and 0, 
for the coefficient on write-off / assets dollar ratio.  For our purpose, however, their result is subject to two 
biases.  First, the sample period pre-dates SFAS No. 12, the accounting rule established March 1995 that 
specifies more stringent criteria for write-offs.  Although it might be argued that the rule is targeted at long-
lived assets, to the extent that discretion is introduced into the process, the test is a joint one, for market 
reaction and the write-off decision.  Second, the analysis pre-dates recent innovations in event analysis, such 
as the use of Fama-French factors and industry controls.  Therefore, it seems prudent to check the empirics 
of our model’s assumptions. 
The second, by Hendricks and Singhal (2003; 2005; 2005), looks at, among other things, the impact of 
announcements of production and shipping delays on firms’ stock market returns.  They classify these delays 
by cause (e.g., customer-induced) and consequences (e.g., quality problems).  They find that returns drop by an 
order of 10% in the days -1 and 0 event period.  Their study is therefore related to our study in that such 
delays could be due to underage in inventory.  Since the focus of their study is not on inventory, none of their 
classifications of cause or consequence is specific to inventory levels or quality.  Another difference is in 
methodology.  In our study, we control for potential confounding informational effects in announcements, 
such as simultaneous announcements of earnings forecasts.   6
3.  Model 
We describe a model along the lines of the “myopia models” described earlier.  There is no discounting 
over time and all agents are risk-neutral.  We assume that the firm’s managers and shareholders are aligned in 
interests and incentives.  We discuss such agency issues in the conclusion.  While the model is intended to 
capture the signaling role of inventory, it is general enough to be applicable to other operational signals. 
In our model, there are two types of firms: competent (which we label C) and incompetent (N).  It is 
common knowledge among firms and the market that a fraction p of the firm population is competent.  A 
firm can take strategies with two dimensions.  One dimension, observed by the market, is inventory level: 
high, medium, or low.  The other dimension, unobserved by the market, is stock availability: also one of high, 
medium, or low.  Figure 1 shows these strategic options.  Competent firms have the freedom to adopt 
strategies along the diagonal, which can be interpreted as a strategic possibility frontier. This idea is 
reminiscent of the fit between functional versus innovative products and physically-efficient versus market-
responsive supply chains, described by Fisher (1997).   Incompetent firms are limited to the bottom left two 
cells.  The top right cells beyond the strategic possibility frontier are infeasible: it is assumed not possible to 
implement say, high-availability with a lower level of inventory than even competent firms can.  The left 
middle cell strategy of medium-availability with high-inventory is suboptimal for competent firms and 
assumed to be infeasible for incompetent ones2. 
If both availability and inventory dimensions of strategies are transparent to the market, we assume the 
market will assign competent firms the correct value of xC and incompetent firms xN, where xC > xN.  We 
consider the situation in which the market cannot observe availability and analyze the case when it sees either 
high or medium levels of inventory.  The case of observing low inventory level is uninteresting, since the 
market can accurately guess that firms are competent and assign them the correct value.  We return to this 
later.  The goal of our analysis is capture the cost and benefits of firms’ deciding whether to take high or 
medium inventory strategies, in the face of a market that cannot tell competent firms from incompetent ones. 
To capture costs,  w e  a s s u m e  t h a t  i t  c o s t s  f i r m s  t o  m o v e  f r o m  h i g h  t o  m e d i u m  i n v e n t o r y  l e v e l s .    
Specifically, it costs competent firms rC and incompetent ones rN , so that at medium inventory levels, the true 
value of firms are reduced to (1 - rC)xC and (1 - rN)xN respectively.  For competent firms, this cost can also be 
                                                      
2 It could be argued that we could assign the left-middle box to incompetent firms, but it turns out that the analysis 
is unchanged.  We use our assumption to simplify the exposition.   7
interpreted as the cost of pursuing suboptimal “stuck in the middle” strategies (e.g., Porter (1980)).  In Figure 
1, it is a sounder strategic position to be in the top-left cell then the middle-center.  In a departure from 
standard signaling models3, we do not need to assume that rC < rN : it is not necessarily more costly for 
incompetent firms to reduce inventory.  To reduce inventory, incompetent firms might have to incur more 
effort and money, but competent firms might have sacrifice more future profits if they do not take advantage 
of forward-buying or lose loyal customers because of frequent stock-outs. 
To see the benefits of firms reducing inventory levels from high to medium, we return to the assumption 
that the market observes only inventory levels and not availability.  When the market sees a high-inventory 
firm, it imputes a simple valuation based on ex ante probabilities: 
 p xC + (1 – p) xN . 
Competent firms will see that their valuation is unreasonably low, since their true value is a higher xC.  
Therefore, competent firms might reduce inventory to medium, to differentiate themselves from incompetent 
ones.  Incompetent firms, facing this, have the incentive to mimic competent ones by lowering to medium 
level too to gain a higher valuation.  We now incorporate both costs and benefits in a model of signaling to 
see who will do what.  There are three stages. 
In stage one, a firm observes its type: competent or incompetent.  One way to think about starting 
positions is that the firm has a newly-appointed management team and is now poised to think what it should 
do.  Another way to interpret this set up is that the competing landscape is always changing, and at stage one, 
this is where the firm finds itself.4 
In stage two, each type of firm decides whether it should signal (i.e., with medium inventory) or not (i.e., 
stay with high inventory).  Although the model rules out methods of signaling other than through inventory 
levels, it does not mean that other signals, such as investing in research or paying bonuses with stock rather 
than cash, are useful.  It does mean that signaling through inventory is relevant at the margin Stein (1988). 
In stage three, the market observes the level of inventory of a firm.  The market then puts a premium m 
on lower (medium, in our case) inventory levels.  This can be interpreted in several ways, all around the theme 
of patience of capital.  A large m represents an impatient capital market, egging the firm onto signaling by 
                                                      
3 The model described by Stein (1988) also departs from standard signaling models, but in his model, both types of 
firms have the same marginal cost of signaling.  He makes this assumption because he assumes signals are small. 
4 In the economics literature, this is the familiar overlapping generations set-up, such as that in Kreps (1990).   8
reducing inventory in the short-term at the expense of longer term benefit.  One practical interpretation of m 
is that it is the weight existing shareholders place on short-term observable performance.  High inventory 
levels incurred through a high-availability strategy, even if they might lead to more loyal customers and better 
performance in the future, lead to undervaluation.  This interpretation is related to the career concern models, 
although the latter are in the different context of managers rather than firms.  As an example, Holmstrom and 
Ricart I Costa (1986) show that when managers worry about developing and protecting their reputation, they 
signal using short-term observables at the expense of longer term performance.  Similarly, Stein (1989) shows 
how such short-term behavior can arise when managers place a premium on today’s stock price that is based 
on expected value of noisy earning streams. 
There can be other interpretations of m , showing the pervasiveness of the phenomenon: (1) the firm 
might need to raise funding in the stock market, so that a lower inventory level can provide the firm with a 
better valuation in such an event (e.g., Grinblatt and Hwang (1989)), (2) managers in the firm face the 
probability  m of being replaced if high inventory is observed, (3) ceteris paribus, the market views other 
information about lower inventory firms more favorably, with an m bias, (4) managers in the firm need to 
periodically sell off their shares in the firm, so they have to ensure that the firm is never undervalued, and (5) 
buyout raiders might take over an competent firm that has high inventory (e.g., Stein (1988)); shareholders of 
the firm are forced to tender their shares for an undervalued price.  Given these myriad interpretations, we 
summarize m as either what the market wants or the weight firms place on having lower inventory. 
There can also be a probabilistic interpretation of m, with benefits that have a cumulative distribution 
function F(v) and costs at c.  That is, m = 1 - F(c).  In the takeover example of Stein (1988), for example, 
raiders incur a cost c of checking out the firm and if they were to takeover the firm and turn it around, the 
benefits v come with distribution F(v).  Therefore, the probability that v exceeds c is 1 - F(c), which is our m.  
In a more generic example, c might is the cost of diagnosing what is happening.  For example, this could be 
interpreted as Berman Capital’s effort needed to investigate the firm’s inventory level, “patrolling the malls” 
and aisles (Alban 2004).  Some elements of c could be determined by public policy.  For example, the 
transparency of inventory information set by regulators and accounting standards can determine how much 
effort is needed to uncover the details.  Laws for or against firing management or takeovers can affect c.  To 
simplify our analysis, we skip F, v, and c and use the deterministic weight m. 
We now describe the perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE).  Under PBE’s, firms choose their optimal   9
inventory level given the market’s beliefs, which are in turn fulfilled by the equilibrium path.  We also want 
these equilibria to satisfy the Cho and Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion off the equilibrium path.  We adapt the 
mechanics in the myopia models, especially Stein (1988), to show the following.5 
Proposition 1  – There exist a separating PBE that satisfies Cho-Kreps, for some parameter values. 
To show proposition 1, we start with the observation that in a PBE in which competent firms always 
signal, the market has separating beliefs so that its Bayesian updating is as follows: (1) if it observes a high 
level of inventory, it is sure the firm is incompetent, and (2) if it observes a medium level of inventory, it is 
sure that is the firm is competent.  In the former case, the market values the firm simply as xN.  In the latter 
case, the market values the firm as (1 – rC).xC , because it is not fooled about the cost of signaling.  This is the 
point made in signal jamming models such as those first studied by Holmstrom (1999a) and Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1986). 
We now examine the firm’s actions to fulfill these beliefs.  If the competent firm signals, it gets a value of 
(1 – rC).xC  for sure.  If it does not, it gets xN.  This xN  is a short-term (under-)valuation, with a weight m ; the 
firm puts weight 1 – m on its true value xC.  Given these, the competent firm signals when: 
  (1 – rC).xC   ≥ m.xN + [1 – m].xC ,      or 
  m  ≥ rC.xC / [xC – xN ].  (1) 
The above is an expression for the break-even value of m in a separating equilibrium, which we denote 
that as ms.  For m ≥ ms , the pressure to reduce inventory is so high that the firm becomes myopic, sacrificing 
the better longer-term strategy of high-availability-high-inventory for medium-availability-medium-inventory. 
The incompetent firm does not signal when: 
  (1 – rN).xC    ≤ xN . 
We assume the cost of signaling rN for incompetent firms is so high it is not worth their while. 
Proposition 2 – There exist a pooling PBE that satisfies Cho-Kreps, for some parameter values. 
There are two pooling equilibria, one in which both competent and incompetent firms signal and one in 
which both do not.  The former is less reasonable since both lose without gaining anything – a sort of 
Prisoner’s Dilemma.  Specifically, both firms reduce inventory by some small amount so that their valuations 
are reduced by a small amount ε < xN ; the market’s belief out-of-equilibrium path is to conclude that any 
                                                      
5 The main difference from Stein (1988) in our model are: (1) we use a typing of firms, (2) which leads us to impose 
additional constraints on m due to having two firm types, and (3) we use different signaling costs for different firm types.   10
firm that has a high level of inventory is incompetent.  This equilibrium is not eliminated by Cho-Kreps.  
Nevertheless, we focus on the more interesting latter equilibrium.  Here, the market has the following 
Bayesian updating process: (1) if it observes a high level of inventory, it concludes that the firm has the ex ante 
probability of being competent, (2) otherwise, it concludes the firm is competent.  The latter is the only out-
of-equilibrium belief that can sustain a pooling equilibrium.  Pooling is sustained if, for the competent firm: 
  (1 – rC).xC   ≤ m.[p.xC + (1 – p).xN] + [1 – m]xC ,      or 
  m ≤ rC.xC / [(1 – p).(xC – xN)]. (2) 
For the incompetent firm, pooling is sustained if: 
  (1 – rN).xC   ≤ m.[p.xC + (1 – p).xN] + [1 – m]xN ,      or 
  m ≤ [rN.xC - (xC – xN) ]/[p.(xC – xN)] (3) 
Therefore, pooling happens when m ≤ mp , where mp is the minimum of the m for both types of firms.  
When the m in (2) is the binding minimum, it is easy to see that mp ≥ ms .  In the middle zone where mp ≥ m ≥ 
ms , the result is ambiguous, with both separating and pooling equilibria sustainable.  This is similar to Stein 
(1988).  When (3) is binding, there may be no overlap between m ≥ ms and m ≤ mp , so that there is no defined 
equilibrium.  It can be shown that mixed strategies such that firms signal with a probability provide equilibria 
in this zone.  Firms’ choice of separating, pooling, or mixed equilibrium in these ambiguous zones might be 
path-dependent.  One intriguing interpretation of this is that private or public policies have lingering effects. 
The upshot of this analysis is that system failures, poor inventory planning, or misaligned incentives 
between buyer and supplier need not be present for stock-outs to be pervasive.  Given the widespread 
managerial and media focus on the “evils” of high inventory, and the simultaneous unobservability (to the 
market) of firms’ strategies and their implications for inventory, it is only rational for firms to maintain lower 
than optimal levels of inventory.  This analysis also makes precise how the parameters would lead to different 
equilibria.  For example: 
•  Weight on short-term valuation, m.  During the take-over wave of the 1980s, for example, we expect that 
firms are more myopic and tend to signal their competence with lower inventory, even among competent 
firms pursuing high-availability strategies.  At that time, short-term valuation can be used as currency for 
acquisitions or defense against takeovers. 
•  Proportion of firms that are competent, p.  In situations where most firms are incompetent, p tends to 
zero, mp tends to ms, and competent firms would be more likely to signal.  An example of this might be   11
the furniture retail industry before consolidation, where most players tend to be subscale.  In this case, 
the theory predicts that even competent firms have the incentive to stock less. 
•  Ability to reduce inventory, rC and rN.  In a market where competent firms are much more capable of 
reducing inventory (say rC tends to zero and rN  is small), separating equilibrium is predicted.  As a 
hypothesis, we surmise that if Wal-mart is considerably more capable of managing inventory than its 
competitors, then a Wal-mart store that is otherwise the same as a competitor would tend to stock less. 
•  Ratio of valuation on incompetent firms to competent ones, xN/xC.  As xN/xC tends to one (the two 
valuations are more similar), mp and ms tend to be high, and the theory predicts no signaling.  This is what 
we might expect. 
The analysis suggests that accounting standards that merely improve the transparency of inventory levels 
is a good first step, but what is also important is information on firms’ operational strategy, such as 
availability levels and forward-buying. 
4.  Empirical Tests of Assumptions 
We test the two assumptions of the model: (1) the market cannot use inventory levels to properly value 
firms and (2) when it can detect inventory as bad, it penalizes firms. 
4.1 Valuation  and  Inventory 
To test whether inventory information can explain stock valuation, we use the following specification: 
 VALUATIONft = β0 + β1.INVENTORYft + Xf.βf + Wftγft + εft ,  (4) 
where VALUATIONft is a suitable measure of the value of firm f at time t, INVENTORYft is a suitably 
scaled level of inventory (and for robustness, is measured using inventory of various types, such as work-in-
progress, finished goods), Xf are unobserved firm fixed effects, Wft are relevant controls, and εft are assumed 
to be independent, identically distributed innovations.  Specifically for Wft, we follow the more recent practice 
for Q regressions, especially Gompers, et al. (2004), and include in it the log of assets and the log of firm age 
(Shin and Stulz, 2000), an indicator that is 1 if the firm is in the S&P 500 (Morck and Yang, 2001), and the 
governance index created by Gompers, et al. (2003).  Because sales are potentially correlated with operations, 
we include log of net sales as a control too. 
The data is obtained from a number of sources.  From CRSP and COMPUSTAT, we obtain financial 
profiles of firms for years between 1950 and 2003.  From IRRC, we obtain the governance index G.  From   12
Professor French’s website6, we obtain the Fama-French industry classifications and their factors for returns 
regressions.  We then link all firm-year observations from these sources, shown in Table 1, panel (a).  While 
the number of observations appears large, we will not be able to use many of them because of the lack of data 
on a few crucial dimensions.  The result is that we use an estimation sample, shown in panel (b).  The sizes of 
the tests are still very significant.  The observations not used provide sufficient information for a Heckman 
sample selection correction we undertake. 
Table 2 reports the first and main measure of VALUATION, which is Tobin’s Q.  This has been used 
for firm valuation since Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Morck, et al. (1988).  We follow the method in 
Gompers, et al. (2003), and use the industry-adjusted median Q, which is the firm’s Q minus the industry-
mean, where we use the Fama and French (1997) 48 industries as classification. 
Panel (a) shows the basic regressions, while panel (b) breaks the sample into quintiles by INVENTORY, 
since the setting in our theory is in situations with high inventory.  Although not a major feature of our 
theory, it is more in conformance with the theory if the market offers firms with low inventory higher 
valuations.  The intuition for this is that the market can tell that firms with low inventory are competent 
(please see figure 1), even if it cannot tell when it observes high or medium levels of inventory. 
In panel (a), as a base case, Model (1) shows a straw man regression.  This is a univariate pooled ordinary 
least squares regression of VALUATION on INVENTORY, in which the latter is measured using inventory 
turns (i.e., inventory scaled by sales).  While INVENTORY has some significance, the weakness of this 
specification is evident in the low adjusted R squared.  In Model (2), we report the estimation of equation (4) 
with fixed effects on firms.  Once we use this more reasonable specification, the significance on 
INVENTORY disappears.  All the signs of the other coefficients replicate the usual results for Q regressions, 
such as those in Gompers, et al. (2003).  The exception is the governance index, which is naturally 
insignificant here because we would not expect much within-firm heterogeneity on that.7  In Model (3), we 
employ the Fama and Macbeth (1973) framework that is the de facto standard in the finance literature.  The 
technique allows cross-sectional correlation while dealing with time-series correlations.  We report only the 
second-stage means in the table.  In Model (4), we deal with the potential problem of sample selection bias.  
                                                      
6 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
7 In a random-effects estimation, the governance index is significant at the 10% level.  The INVENTORY variable 
continues to be insignificant.  A Hausman test produces a χ2(6) statistic of 57.11, so we reject the null that random 
effects are admissible, at the 0.000% significance level.   13
For example, looking at the difference between the two panels in Table 1, it might be argued that because the 
estimation sample is restricted to the 1990s and early 2000s, inventory levels might have been overwhelmed 
by noise in the technology bubble and accounting scandals.  It can also be pointed out that the estimation 
sa mp le is different  in  t erms o f ca sh  cycles o r a sset  in t en sity.  T o dea l wit h  po ssib le b ia s, we emp lo y a 
Heckman (1979) procedure using a probit selection model with the following covariates: year, age, market 
cap, receivables, payables, plant-property-and-equipment, and working capital.8  The corrected estimation 
uses different measures of INVENTORY and has more control variables, as an example of the type of 
robustness tests used.  Digressing on a note about robustness, we list here the different measures and 
controls that are also used for all previous models; the results are qualitatively the same and are not reported 
here: 
1.  VALUATION.  Instead of Q, we also measure valuation with buy-and-hold returns9 and the 
measures of performance described by Gaur, et al. (1999): year-on-year sales growth, operating 
margin, and return on equity. 
2.  INVENTORY.  Instead of inventory turn on sales, we also use a finer breakdown, at the level of 
materials, work-in-progress, finished goods, and LIFO (last-in-first-out) reserves.  As yet another 
alternative, we regress on inventory divided by assets, rather than sales. 
3.  Control variables: We include all the covariates in the Heckman selection model.  In addition, we also 
have an indicator on whether the firm has undergone an acquisition or merger in the year prior to 
that of the observation, indicators for the identity of the auditor of the firm, indicators for different 
audit opinions10, and inventory valuation methods.11 
4.  Econometric methods: Besides dealing with potential heteroscadasticity using Huber-White robust 
standard errors, we manage potential correlation with clustering and Fama-MacBeth techniques. 
Returning to model (4), we report a regression with INVENTORY measured at a finer breakdown, with 
the additional control variables described above.  We also cluster at the firm level to deal with serial 
                                                      
8 As usual, to reduce specification errors, we use logs for all but the year variable. 
9 The specifications on buy-and-hold return regressions follow those in Gompers, et al. (2003), in which we regress 
on INVENTORY as well as the usual Fama-French factors (SML and HML).  The abnormal return is the alpha term of 
the regressions.  Please see equation (5) later for details. 
10 Auditor opinions are classified into unaudited, unqualified, qualified, disclaimer or no opinion, unqualified with 
explanatory language, and adverse opinion. 
11 The inventory valuation methods are classified into:  no inventory; first in, first out (FIFO); last in, first out 
(LIFO); “specific identification’; average cost; retail method; standard cost; current or replacement cost; not reported.   14
correlation.  We once again obtain the result that INVENTORY does not explain VALUATION. 
As pointed earlier, it might be counter-argued that our theory is one for high levels of inventory, and it 
would be stronger empirical support if we find that at low levels of inventory, inventory does explain 
valuation.  In Table 2, Panel (b), we repeat the fixed effects estimation of Model (2) on quintiles of the 
sample, ordered by INVENTORY.  As predicted, INVENTORY is not significant at high levels of 
inventory.  Specifically, once inventory turn exceeds 0.115, we find that INVENTORY loses its explanatory 
power. Below this level, INVENTORY becomes increasingly significant as we go down the quintiles, and has 
the right (negative) signs.  We also observe that each quintile regression is significant and has a small p-value. 
4.2  Valuation and “Bad” Inventory 
Our theory assumes that when the market sees high inventory, it does not know whether the inventory is 
good or bad and so it cannot properly value firms.  For the theory to be robust, we test the counter-factual: if 
inventory is revealed to be bad, then the market will de-value the firm.  We use an event analysis to test 
whether the market reacts negatively to announcements of inventory write-offs.  This is a reasonable test 
because it provides some exogenous shock.  However, like all tests of this nature, it is really a joint test of 
market efficiency (does the market react quickly?) and the null hypothesis of interest (does the market react 
negatively?).  It is therefore, a one-sided test: if we find that the market reacts negatively, we can be persuaded 
that inventory write-offs are bad for firm valuation.  However, if we do not find negative reaction, we cannot 
rule out the joint hypotheses. 
We should also worry about factors that might confound the link between write-off and market reaction: 
(1) write-off decisions could be discretionary, (2) even if write-offs are not discretionary, decisions on the 
timing of announcements could be, and (3) even if both types of decisions are not discretionary, 
announcements of write-offs are often made at the same time as earnings announcements, so the reaction 
may be attributed to earnings information rather than write-offs. 
Our datasets are constructed to deal with these issues.  To deal with (1), we make use of one institutional 
detail, that write-off decisions after the March 1995 SFAS No. 12 have become less (but obviously not totally) 
discretionary.  Therefore, we construct a sample after that date.  Issue (2), fortunately, is not crucial to our 
study because the timing of announcements is orthogonal to our relationship of interest, between write-off   15
and market reaction12.  On (3), we construct a sample which we believe are rid of confounding news.  We use 
the First Call dataset of earnings announcements, in which we first screen for announcements with footnotes 
on inventory write-offs.13 
To eliminate the confounding impact of simultaneous earnings announcements, we restrict the sample to 
announcements in which the analyst consensus of expected earnings (within 90 days of announcement) is 
“near” the actual earnings.  For robustness, we define “near” in different ways, as observations for which 
expected and actual earnings are within 5% of each other, and then within 0%, 1%, and 10%.  These 
variations do not change the qualitative results and are not reported here.  Table 3 shows the summary of the 
First Call sample using the baseline “within 5%” definition of “near”.  We see that CONSECO is unusual, 
being both a financial conglomerate (but classified as manufacturing in COMPUSTAT) and has a large 
$350M write-off.  Table 4 shows the results of the event analysis, using Eventus (Cowan, 2003), with this 
observation.  Estimations without it yield the same (unreported) results.  In panel (a), we report the market-
model analyses, which use a 90-day estimation window for the days analysis and a 7-month window for the 
months analyses.  Both CRSP-indexed value- and equal-weighted models suggest the same behavior: there is 
significant negative reaction around the day of the announcement.  As usual, there appears to be some news 
leakage before the day.  The monthly analyses show the reaction clearly, with a -7.44% reaction in the month 
of the announcement.  Panel (b) reports results from a Fama and French (1993) regression: 
 R jt - Rft = αt + ßt(Rmt - Rft) + stSMBt + htHMLt + εjt ,  (5) 
where t is the time subscript, Rjt is the return for the jth stock, Rft the risk-free return, Rmt the market 
return, SMBt the small-medium-large factor, and HMLt the high-medium-low factor.  This framework takes 
care of risk heterogeneity.  The mean cumulative abnormal return is 7.73% in the month of the 
                                                      
12 It is of course conceivable that late announcements might have some effect on the size of the market reaction to 
write-offs.  Since we are primarily testing the direction of the reaction, this is not crucial.  But even if we are interested in 
the size of the reaction, the fact that announcements cannot be delayed beyond a financial year suggests that the impact 
is probably not substantial.  We should, however, bear in mind this factor when interpreting size effects. 
13 Specifically, we obtained all 114,139 footnotes with the word “Inventory,” and after manual inspection of the 
footnotes, decide to screen for those with “Inventory” and one of the following words in the footnote: “reserve,” 
adjacent “mark” and “down,” “charge,” “obsol” (for obsolete, obsolescence, etc.), “write” (for write-offs, write-downs, 
etc.), “loss.”  The items screened out are also manually inspected to ensure proper screening.  The result is 1,145 
footnotes.  Although First Call says that the footnotes are issued with earnings announcements, we find that only some 
footnotes are linked to earnings announcements.  It is unclear how the other footnotes are linked, so we restrict our 
sample to only the linked ones.  We use different definitions of linking, including being on exactly the same dates and 
within 30 days of each other.  There is qualitatively no difference in our results to these definitions.  For the 30-day 
definition reported in this paper, there are 702 announcement observations.  It is from these that we select the final 
sample which does not have confounding news on earnings, as described in the main text.   16
announcement, close to the result from the market-model. 
Longer-term abnormal returns are outside the prediction of our theory, but we note that they are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.  This is consistent with the story that even inventory write-offs are 
noisy signals.  The short-term negative reaction is an over-reaction and that given time, stock prices return to 
pre-announcement levels.  We are more comfortable with the standard story that long-term returns are 
subject to many confounding intermediate effects (e.g., Mitchell and Stafford (2000)), although the first story 
would bolster our case that inventory signals are noisy. 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
We have started with the observation that there is a general consensus among practitioners that inventory 
is root of many evils in operations management.  The stock market hates inventory, the media abhors it, and 
managers detest it.  Of course, inventory is not always bad.  For example, it can be a by-product of a high-
availability strategy or rational forward-buying.  The problem is that market cannot tell what strategy firms are 
pursuing.  It is difficult to measure service levels or communicate forward-buying implementation.  We 
propose a model to analyze the implication of these observations.  The model works out the signaling role of 
inventory.  Under specified conditions, firms rationally want to lower their inventory levels below what 
optimal news-vendor solutions might suggest, so as to signal that they are operationally competent.  The 
more it is perceived that high inventory levels are bad, and the more unobserved are firm strategies, the more 
this suboptimal cutback in inventory should happen. 
The theory assumes that market cannot tell what high levels of inventory means, so at high levels, 
inventory levels cannot explain firm valuation.  Our empirical results support this.  Our model also assumes 
the counter-factual, that the market does react negatively to poor operations management, as when inventory 
is revealed to be bad.  Our empirical results also support this. 
We couch our finding as tentative evidence for the inventory signaling hypothesis.  As with any 
hypothesis, it cannot be proven true but can be falsified, in the same way that say, the efficient market 
hypothesis in finance is supported not by being proven true but by voluminous failed attempts to falsify it.14 
Our model has been worked out as if the firm is a monolithic, aligned entity, without agency problems 
between managers and shareholders.  Suppose the managers are keen to not only increase share price for 
                                                      
14 We acknowledge many recent substantive attempts to show that markets are inefficient – e.g., Shleifer (2000).   17
shareholders, but also their private benefits related to inventory.  The latter benefits could come with higher 
levels of inventory (.e.g., outright stealing of some of it, jobs for friends to handle the greater complexity, or a 
job that looks more important or secure with bigger warehouses).  It could also come with lower levels of 
inventory (e.g., an easier job with smaller warehouses).  It does not appear that agency problems have a clear 
prediction of how they might modify our theory.  This could be an interesting area for further research. 
We see future work on several other fronts.  One is more solid empirical evidence for the phenomenon 
of inventory signaling.  A direct test is hard, because we need to benchmark inventory levels against what they 
“should have been.”  Another research direction is to look at other operational signals, such as receivables, 
payables, returns, or shrinkage.  It might also be fruitful to see how signaling in the way described here might 
be applicable not with capital markets, but with others in the supply chain (e.g., Iyer, et al. (2005)).  Finally, it 
is intriguing to examine the corporate governance and public policy issues associated with fixing the problems 
analyzed here, to improve overall welfare. 
What is the implication of all this for management?  Inventory has a signaling role primarily because of 
two factors: (1) the market cannot observe firms’ operations strategies, and (2) capital markets are impatient 
and nervous about waiting for the possibility that the firm in question actually has competent management, 
and that high levels of inventory would pay back in the future in terms of say, more loyal customers (high-
availability) or lower costs-of-good-sold (forward-buying).  Fixing (1) might require making inventory 
accounting more transparent.  The analysis suggests that another lever is in fixing (2).  A logical guess is that 
high-availability operations are usually associated with (or should be sought by) patient, sophisticated 
investors.  Perhaps this is why, among other reasons, many high-availability outfits, from the Ritz Carlton to 
Coutts (the private bank), are or have to be privately-held, at least for long periods of their history.15  Our 
analysis also works out what all wise shareholders and other principals know, that obsessions with single 
dimensions of performance measures such as inventory often have insidious effects on incentives and 
optimization. 
                                                      
15 As an example, the Ritz-Carlton was in private hands for much of its history since the late 1800’s, from Edward 
Wyner and Gerlad Blakely to William Johnson. It was bought by Marriott International in 1995.  Marriott, of course, is 
also a closely held firm (source: Ritz-Carlton corporate website).   18
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics of Sample for Valuation Analysis 
(a) Full sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
Year 228,958 1987 12 1950 2003 
Net sales ($M)  211,258 1,018 5,367 -204 257,157 
Q 176,111 2.2 43.7 0.05 14,207 
Op Income before depr ($M)  206,746 167 1,008 -5,743 61,188 
Inventory - total ($M)  204,723 148 2,290 -3 372,998 
Inventory – materials ($M)  111,537 24 139 0 6,457 
Inventory – work in prog ($M)  105,172 21 188 -37 12,114 
Inventory – finished goods ($M)  109,397 44 257 -8 14,298 
Inventory – LIFO reserves ($M)  144,585 12 112 -139 7,700 
Inventory total/net sales (turn) 201,726 0.19 3.98 -34.66 1,671.00 
Inventory total over assets  204,677 0.16 0.17 -0.01 22.45 
Age 228,958 10.4 9.6 1 54 
Market cap ($M)  211,073 1,003 7,012 0 508,330 
Receivables ($M)  204,167 707 9,209 0 912,604 
Payables ($M)  193,751 609 8,458 0 643,556 
Plant, property, equipment ($M)  192,607 85 540 -290 33,143 
Working cap ($M)  181,879 89 618 -37,532 46,313 
S&P 500  15,398 1 0 1 1 
G index  7,128 9 3 1 18 
Acquisitions 228,958 0.065 0.247 0 1 
 
(b) Estimation sample (i.e., with observations on all relevant variables) 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
Year 5973 1997 4 1990 2002 
Net sales ($M)  5973 3,859 10,337 0 184,214 
Q  5973           1.8            1.6             0.3                37.8 
Op Income before depr ($M)  5896 734 2,651 -3,695 61,188 
Inventory - total ($M)  5973 666 5,895 - 173,388 
Inventory – materials ($M)  3470 73 260 - 6,457 
Inventory – work in prog ($M)  3305 57 256 0 7,051 
Inventory – finished goods ($M)  3501 139 416 - 7,319 
Inventory – LIFO reserves ($M)  5275 28 162 -60 6,800 
Inventory total/net sales (turn)  5973 0 1 - 31 
Inventory total over assets  5973 0.12 0.14 0 0.91 
Age 5973 22.9 14.2 1 53 
Market cap ($M)  5973 5,317 19,838 1 476,116 
Receivables ($M)  5895 857 9,003 - 414,886 
Payables ($M)  5918 2,217 21,092 - 802,608 
Plant, property, equipment ($M)  5876 285 1,064 (0) 33,143 
Working cap ($M)  5403 269 1,223 -33,780 35,832 
S&P 500  5973 0 0 - 1 
G index  5973 9 3 1 18 
Acquisitions 4444 92 779 -571 34,697   23
Table 2 – Valuation and Inventory. 
 
(a) Estimations on all INVENTORY quintiles 
 
Dependent variable: VALUATION, 











Total inventory  .021 (.005)*** -.063 (.121)  -.086 (.057)   
Materials inventory      -.031  (.070) 
Working capital inventory      -.024  (.721) 
Finished goods inventory      -.587  (.373) 
LIFO reserves      2.065  (1.414)
CONTROLS       
Log assets    -.683 (-.683)*** -.164 (.027)*** -1.440 (.086)***
Log firm age    -.262 (.086)***  -.069 (.030)*** .196  (.047)***
Log sales    .723 (.069)  .129 (.029)***  .215 (.058) 
S&P 500     1.96 (.59)***  .377 (.055)***  .071 (.082) 
G, governance index    -.00059 (.01730) -.007 (.008)  -.014 (.059) 
Log market cap      1.424  (.090)***
Log receivables      .011  (.057) 
Log payables      -.154  (.049)***
Log working cap      -.082  (.032)**
Indicator for acquisition      .106  (.044)** 
Indicator for year      Yes 
Indicator for Inventory method      Yes 
Indicator for auditor firm      Yes 
Indicator for audit opinion      Yes 
Constant  2.057 (.102)*** .535 (.312)*  .638 (.128)***  -1.081 (.606)*
N  169,446 5,973  5,973 6,040 
Adj. R squared  .01% 6.26%    - 
p-value  .0001 .0000    .0000 
 
 
(b) Estimations on all INVENTORY quintiles using fixed effects model (2) 
 
Quintile  1 2 3 4 5 













Adj R  squared  5.7% 1.0% 0.9% 2.0% 2.5% 
p-value  .000 .074 .000 .000 .000 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10%.  Figures in brackets are standard errors. 
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Table 3 – Summary Statistics of Sample for Event Analysis (example first 42 of 61 firms, by firm name) 










PERIOD FIRST  CALL  FOOTNOTE 
1  A G C O CORP    3-Feb-00  -0.20  -0.20 -0.20 31-Dec-99  0.05 inv writedown 
2  A M L I RESIDE  5-Feb-02  2.59  2.70  2.70 31-Dec-01  exc  0.08 charge fr inv 
3  A M X CORP      19-Jan-99  0.16  0.16 0.16 31-Dec-98  0.14 inv writedown 
4  A V X CORP NEW  10-Oct-01  0.02  0.02  0.02  30-Sep-01  $32.5M inv writedown 
5 ADFLEX  SOLUTIO  19-Jan-96  0.36  0.37  0.37  31-Dec-95  1.88 inv writedown 
6 ADVANCED  RADIO  10-Nov-98  -0.56  -0.58  -0.53  30-Sep-98  $2.7M inv writedown 
7 ALBERTO  CULVER  27-Jul-95  0.25  0.24  0.23  30-Jun-95  0.02 inv writedown 
8 AMERICAN  HOME    18-Oct-99  0.48  0.47  0.47  30-Sep-99  0.07 inv writedown 
9  ASHLAND INC     25-Jan-99  0.62  0.60 0.65 31-Dec-98  0.76 inv writedown 
10AVIALL INC NEW  12-Feb-02  0.51  0.50  0.50  31-Dec-01  exc $8.9M net loss on inv, intan writedown 
11AVONDALE INDUS  28-Jan-99  2.23  2.18  2.18  31-Dec-98  exc 0.10 charge fr steel inv adjustment 
12B H A GROUP HO  20-Jul-99  0.12  0.12  0.11  30-Jun-99  0.04 inv writedown 
13BELLSOUTH CORP  20-Oct-99  0.51  0.50  0.50  30-Sep-99  Restated fr   0.51 down for inv writedown. 
14BERINGER WINE   28-Oct-99  0.42  0.41  0.41  30-Sep-99  0.04 inv writedown 
15BERINGER WINE   27-Apr-99  0.49  0.47  0.47  31-Mar-99  0.11 inv writedown 
16BROWN SHOE INC  27-Feb-02  1.61 1.62  1.62  31-Jan-02  exc  0.60 charge fr inv markdowns 
17CABLE DESIGN T  1-Oct-01  0.93  0.93  0.92  31-Jul-01  exc 0.04 charge fr bad debt and inv valuation
18CAMTEK LTD      13-Nov-02  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  30-Sep-02  0.07  inv writedown 
19CARAUSTAR INDU  12-Feb-96  0.51  0.51  0.50  31-Dec-95  $4.8M inv writedown 
20CELADON GROUP   27-Apr-98  0.24  0.24  0.24  31-Mar-98  0.04 inv writedown 
21CHASE INDUSTRI  12-Feb-99  0.22  0.22  0.22 31-Dec-98  0.14  inv writedown 
22COCA COLA CO    19-Jul-00  0.42  0.41  0.41  30-Jun-00  0.02 inv writedown 
23CONGOLEUM CORP 6-May-96  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10  31-Mar-96  0.01 inv writedown 
24CONSECO INC     23-Feb-00  3.23  3.36 3.20 31-Dec-99  $350M inv writedown 
25D D I CORP      29-Jan-02  0.41  0.42  0.41  31-Dec-01  exc $3.7M charge fr inv impairment 
26EON COMMUNICAT  29-Aug-02  -0.32  -0.32  -0.32  31-Jul-02  exc 0.07 charge for adj value of excess inv 
27EXAR CORP       22-Oct-02  0.04  0.04  0.04  30-Sep-02  $2.3M inv writedown 
28FALCON PRODUCT  3-Sep-98  0.25  0.26  0.26  31-Jul-98  0.31 inv writedown 
29FIRST HORIZON   6-Nov-02  0.07  0.07  0.06  30-Sep-02  $1.2M inv writedown 
30GENUINE PARTS   19-Feb-02  2.08  2.11  2.10  31-Dec-01  exc $17.4M charge fr inv exit 
31GOODYEAR TIRE   21-Oct-99  0.51  0.49  0.51  30-Sep-99  0.63 inv writedown 
32GUESS INC       8-Mar-01  -0.30  -0.30 -0.31 31-Dec-00  $5.7M inv writedown 
33GULFSTREAM AER  9-Feb-99  3.00  2.94  2.95  31-Dec-98  inc 4.5M charge fr inv setup, goodwill amorti 
34H M T TECHNOLO  14-Jan-99  0.03  0.03  0.03  31-Dec-98  0.04 inv writedown 
35ILLINOVA CORP   1-May-97  0.08  0.08  0.08  31-Mar-97  0.01 inv writedown 
36J D S UNIPHASE  24-Jan-02  -0.02  -0.02 -0.02 31-Dec-01  $80M inv writedown 
37KIMBERLY CLARK  22-Oct-98  0.63  0.62  0.62  30-Sep-98  0.13 inv writedown 
38L T X CORP      14-Feb-02  -0.26  -0.26  -0.26  31-Jan-02  $42.2M inv writedown 
39MCDONNELL DOUG  18-Jul-95  0.74  0.72  0.73  30-Jun-95  0.10 inv writedown 
40METRICOM INC    12-Feb-98  -0.95  -0.93 -0.93 31-Dec-97  0.26 inv writedown 
41MICROWAVE POWE  25-Jul-96  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  30-Jun-96  0.06 inv writedown 
42MONACO COACH C  7-May-96  0.05  0.05  0.05  31-Mar-96  0.08 inv writedown   25
Table 4 – Results of Event Analyses 
(a) Market-model 
 
Days  N Mean  CAR
1  Precision weighted CAAR
2  t  Generalized sign Z
3 
Value-weighted 
(-30,-2) 61  -6.25%  -5.43% -2.348*** -1.861** 
(-1,0) 61  -0.24%  -0.54%  -0.343  0.964 
(+1,+30) 61  -6.03%  -7.52%  -2.228**  -1.348$ 
Equal-weighted 
(-30,-2) 61  -3.80%  -2.47% -1.416*  -1.01 
(-1,0) 61  -0.08%  -0.23%  -0.109  0.529 
(+1,+30) 61  -4.74%  -6.07%  -1.739**  -0.753 
 
 
Months  N  Mean CAR  Precision weighted CAAR  t  Generalized sign Z 
Value-weighted 
(-6,-2) 60  -7.02%  -8.38%  -1.125  -0.945 
(-1,0) 60  -7.44%  -8.94%  -1.885**  -1.462* 
(+1,+6) 60  -0.10%  -0.11%  -0.015  0.606 
Equal-weighted 
(-6,-2) 60  -7.50%  -7.80%  -1.268  0.104 
(-1,0) 60  -8.48%  -9.48%  -2.267**  -2.220** 
(+1,+6) 60  -2.60%  -2.35%  -0.402  -0.154 
 
(b) Fama-French factors 
 
Days  Mean CAR  T 
(-30,-2) -3.99% -1.384** 
(-1,0) 0.24% 0.234 
(+1,+30) -4.82% -1.677*** 
 
Months  Mean CAR  T 
(-12,-2) -15.62% -2.184** 
(-1,0) -7.73%  -2.588*** 
(+1,+12) 6.57%  0.653 
 
1 CAR = cumulative abnormal return.  It is the sum of the prediction error (see equation (2)) over the 
period concerned. 








N == ∑∑  
where ajt is the abnormal return for the jth stock at time t. 
3  The Generalized sign Z statistic tests the null that the fraction of positive returns is the same as in 
the estimation window; see Singh, et al. (1991). 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 